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THE MANVILLE BANKRUPTCY: TREATING MASS
TORT CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS
The reorganization petition filed in federal bankruptcy
court by the Manville Corporation on August 26, 1982,1 placed
a major challenge before the new federal bankruptcy system,
which the Supreme Court had recently shaken with its decision
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co.2 Whereas Congress had foreseen the issues raised by the
Northern Pipeline case 3 when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA),4 it did not anticipate that a healthy
and solvent corporation 5 might seek refuge from potentially
massive but speculative tort liability in the BRA's chapter ii
reorganization provisions. Although Manville and UNR
Industries 6 are the first such apparently healthy corporations
1 In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos.
filed Aug. 26, 1982).

82

B 1x,656 to

82 B

i1,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). The Supreme Court held unconstitutional the new
bankruptcy system created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA), Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at ii U.S.C., in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.,
and in scattered sections of other titles (Supp. V i981)). The basis of the Court's
holding was that, although the bankruptcy courts were established under article I of
the Constitution, they were empowered by the BRA to adjudicate matters of private
rights over which only article III courts are to have jurisdiction. 102 S. Ct. at 287980.
The Supreme Court originally stayed its judgment until October 4, 1982, id. at
288o, and subsequently extended the stay until December 24, 1982, to permit Congress
to correct the constitutional problem. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 1O3 S. Ct. 199 (1982). Although the December 24 deadline passed
without congressional action, this Note does not consider Northern Pipeline's effect
on the Manville case; it is assumed that Congress will take action to reconstitute the
bankruptcy courts in such a manner that they will be empowered to exercise the same
jurisdiction exercised before Northern Pipeline.
3 See Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 4 th Cong., ist & 2d
Sess. (1975-1976); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 63-87 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963, 6023-49.
4 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at ii U.S.C., in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C., and in scattered sections of other titles (Supp. V i981)). The BRA,

which became effective on October 1, 1979, for any bankruptcy proceeding initiated
on or after that date, replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544
(codified as amended at i U.S.C., in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., and in scattered
sections of other titles (1976)), and as codified in ii U.S.C. is known as the Bankruptcy
Code.
5 Manville's financial statements at the time of its chapter ii filing showed a net
worth (total shareholders' equity) of $1.2 billion. Consolidated Balance Sheet Filed
with Chapter ii Petition, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11,656 to 82 B
11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. fied Aug. 26, 1982).
6 UNR Industries (Unarco), a codefendant in most of the asbestos-related litigation,
is a smaller corporation that produced asbestos only until 1962. UNR was actually
1121
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to file chapter i i petitions in the face of massive tort claims,
manufacturers in a variety of industries that face similar liability could follow suit.
The Manville filing presents a stark contrast to the traditional reorganization case, in which the debtor knows the
identities of its creditors and the amount of its debts. In such
cases, the debtor seeks the aid of the court only in restructuring
its finances and satisfying its existing creditors to the greatest
extent possible. The most extraordinary aspects of the Manville case are that the majority of Manville's creditors are
unknown and that the majority of the debts on which Manville
bases its claims of prospective insolvency are contingent and
unliquidated. 7 Manville thus appears to be attempting to use
the bankruptcy power largely as a tool to limit the aggregate
size of its current and future liabilities. 8 If successful, Manville's strategy will have a profound effect on all asbestosrelated tort litigation; Manville is the nation's largest asbestos
manufacturer 9 and the "deepest pocket"' 0 among the codefendants in the many asbestos-related suits.
This Note employs the Manville case to examine whether
and how the bankruptcy system may appropriately be used by
an otherwise solvent company facing massive tort liability.
Part I examines the bankruptcy courts' equitable and statutory
powers to dismiss reorganization petitions filed in bad faith,
and explores both the standards for determining when a petition may be deemed to have been filed in bad faith and the
the first asbestos manufacturer to file a chapter i petition. See In re ONR Indus.,
Nos. 82-B- 9 841 to 82-B-9851 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. filed July 29, 1982). Yet another
asbestos manufacturer, Amatex Corporation, joined UNR and Manville on November
1, 1982. In re Amatex Corp., No. 82-05,22oK (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed Nov. I, x982).
7 In both the advertisement that appeared in major newspapers the day after
Manville's filing, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 2982, at 29, col. I, and an affidavit filed
with Manville's chapter ii petition, Affidavit Under Local Rule XI-2 of James F.
Beasley at 6-7, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B II,656 to 82 B 11,676 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982), Manville stated that it is currently defendant or
codefendant in approximately 16,5oo asbestos-related claims. It further stated that
its decision to file under chapter ii was based on a study it commissioned from
Epidemiology Resources, Inc., which estimated the minimum number of future lawsuits against Manville at 30,000. See A. Walker, Projections of Asbestos-Related
Disease: i98o-2oo9, at 27 (Epidemiology Resources, Inc., Final Report, Aug. 2, 1982).
Thus, of the approximately 5o,ooo present and projected claims on which Manville
blames its filing, almost 30,ooo have not yet been brought and will be filed (if at all)
by unknown plaintiffs, while nearly all So,ooo are contingent and unliquidated.
8 See infra note 54.
9 Greer, Going Bankrupt to Flee the Public, 235 NATION 36o (1982); N.Y. Times,
Aug. 27, 1982, at i, col. 6.
10 Manville is ranked i8ist in the Fortune 5oo. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at
i, col. 6.
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manner in which those standards should be applied to a Manville-type debtor." Part II argues that the Manville bankruptcy court has the discretion to dispose of the asbestos claims
before it either by estimating each claim individually or by
estimating only the aggregate of the claims and leaving individual estimation to other courts. The policies underlying the
doctrines of pendent jurisdiction and the right to trial by jury
suggest that the bankruptcy court should leave the estimation
of individual claims to state courts and other federal courts.
I.

APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF DISMISSAL OF BAD FAITH
REORGANIZATION PETITIONS TO MANVILLE

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of x978 reaffirms bankruptcy
courts' broad equitable' 2 and statutory powers to deal flexibly
with unorthodox bankruptcy petitions by means ranging from
dismissal to extraordinary relief. 13 The new Bankruptcy Code
14
has been interpreted to confer the traditional equitable power
to dismiss petitions filed in bad faith, even though the Code
does not explicitly impose a good faith requirement.' 5 The
11Creditors may also attempt to challenge Manville-type chapter ix petitions on
the ground that the constitutional bankruptcy power does not extend to healthy,
solvent debtors. The leading Supreme Court case addressing this issue, however, is
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. (Rock Island),
294 U.S. 648 (1935), which held that the bankruptcy clause should be interpreted
very liberally and that the bankruptcy power can extend even to debtors who are
solvent in the bankruptcy sense. Id. at 668, 672-73; see infra note 34. This Note
does not address the constitutional issue further, but focuses rather on dismissal for
bad faith.
12 The equity powers are reaffirmed most directly in 28 U.S.C. § 1481, which
provides in pertinent part that "[a] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court
of equity, law, and admiralty." 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981). In addition, ii
U.S.C. § io5(a) provides that "[t]he bankruptcy court may issue any order, process,
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
ix id. § io5(a).
13See ii id. § 3o5 (abstention from case); id. § 362(d) (lifting or modifying automatic stay); id. § 51o (equitable subordination); id. § 1I12(b) (dismissal of chapter ix
petition or conversion to chapter 7 proceeding); id. § 1129 (denial of confirmation of
plan not proposed in good faith or not in conformity with other requirements of
Bankruptcy Code); id. § 1141(d)(z) (allowing proponent of plan or court in its confirmation order to deny or modify discharge); 28 id. § 14 7i(d) (abstention from "a
particular proceeding arising under title xi or arising in or related to a case under
title ii"). As these sections indicate, the courts may exercise some flexibility in taking
steps short of dismissal to rectify perceived inequities of either a substantive or a
procedural nature.
14 See, e.g., Sherman v. Collins (In re Collins), 75 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1934); Zeitinger
v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 F. 719, 722-23 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
245 U.S. 667 (1917); Gaffney, Bankruptcy Petitions Filed in Bad Faith: What Actions
Can Creditors Counsel Take?, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 205, 210-11 (1980).
Is Unlike chapter ii of the Bankruptcy Code, chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
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"bad faith" doctrine that was developed at common law has
been held to be incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code
through section iii2(b), which permits bankruptcy courts to

dismiss a petition "for cause," whether or not such cause is
among the nine explicitly enumerated in section 1112(b).16
Typically, reorganization cases dismissed for bad faith have
been of four types: those in which there is no reasonable chance
of successful rehabilitation, 17 those that attempt to work a
of 1898 imposed a requirement that reorganization petitions be filed in good faith. ii
U.S.C. § 541 (1976) (amended 1978). Chapter X contained a nonexclusive definition
of bad faith in § 146, II U.S.C. § 546 (1976) (amended 1978), a definition that included
cases in which it was unreasonable to expect that a reorganization plan could be
effected, cases in which the petitioning creditors obtained their claims solely for the
purpose of filing the petition, cases in which the interests of creditors and stockholders
would be best served by allowing pending litigation of the reorganization issues to go
forward in other courts, and cases in which adequate debtor relief would have been
available through chapter XI of the Act. Chapter XI of the 1898 Act contained
neither a requirement nor a definition of good faith. See ii U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976)
(amended 1978).
16 The provision governing the dismissal of an entire case or the conversion of a
chapter ii reorganization to a chapter 7 liquidation reads in part:
[Oln request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may
convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title or may
dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest of creditors
and the estate, for cause, including (1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable
likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any time
fixed by the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of additional
time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of this title,
and denial of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan under section
1129 of this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan; and
(9) termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified
in the plan.
ii U.S.C. § iii2(b) (Supp. V 1981). The courts have read § 1112(b) to permit the
dismissal of petitions for lack of good faith. See, e.g., Weathersfield Farms, Inc. v.
First Inter-State Bank, 15 Bankr. 282, 283 (D. Vt. 1981); In re Bonded Mailings,
Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 785 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Alton Tel. Printing Co., 14
Bankr. 238 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. x981). Such an interpretation is made possible by § 102(3)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifies that the terms "includes" and "including"
are not limiting, 1I U.S.C. § 102(3) (Supp. V 1981), and by the legislative history of
§ 1112(b). See S. REP. No. 989, 9 5 th Cong., 2d Sess. 117, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5903; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 4o6,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6362.
17 See, e.g., Fidelity Assurance Ass'n v. Sims, 318 U.S. 6o8, 615-16 (1943);
Weathersfield Farms, Inc. v. First Inter-State Bank, 15 Bankr. 282, 283 (D. Vt. 1981);
In re Imperial Heights Apartments, Ltd., 18 Bankr. 858, 863-64 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982).
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fraud on the court, 18 those filed to settle internal disputes of
a business entity, 19 and those in which the conduct of the
debtor clearly indicates that its sole intent is to hinder or delay
its creditors. 20 Manville's filing does not necessarily fit within
any of these categories. First, the strength of Manville's ongoing operations leaves no doubt that a successful reorganization is feasible. 2 1 Second, although some asbestos claimants
have alleged that Manville has attempted to defraud the court
by placing assets in newly created subsidiaries beyond the
court's reach, 22 those allegations remain unproven; in any
event, proof of such a segregation of assets would more likely
result in the bankruptcy judge's taking control of the segregated assets than in the dismissal of the entire case. Third,
Manville's filing is clearly motivated by external problems with
creditors rather than by internal squabbles. Finally, although
the tort claimants argue that hindrance and delay are indeed
Manville's primary motives, courts have generally been reluctant to find such a motive except in the most extreme cases,
those in which it appears that delay is the sole reason for the
filing.

23

These four categories are illustrative rather than exclusive;

that Manville may not fit neatly within any of them does not
mean that its petition may not be dismissed. The underlying
inquiry, as in all instances of alleged bad faith reorganization
petitions, is whether the debtor "seeks to abuse the bankruptcy
law by employing it for a purpose for which it was not in1 See, e.g., In re Distillers Factors Corp., 187 F.2d 685, 688-89 (3d Cir. 1951);
Zeitinger v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 F. 719, 722-23 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917); In re PM Properties, 12 COLLIER BANKR. CAs.
(AIB) 139, 144 & n.13 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1977).
19 See, e.g., In re Rice-Varick Hotel, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 864, 865 (D.N.H. 1959).
20 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 354 (1932); In re 299 Jack-Hemp
Assocs., 2o Bankr. 42, 413 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).

21 A "successful" reorganization is intended here to mean not a reorganization that
satisfies every interested party, but rather a reorganization that results in a viable
going concern.
22 See Application for Dismissal of Cases or Abstention at 3, U1-13, In re JohnsManville Corp., Nos. 82 B i,656 to 82 B 11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26,
1982).

23 See Weathersfield Farms, Inc. v. First Inter-State Bank, 15 Bankr. 282 (D. Vt.
i98i); Gaffney, supra note 14, at 232-33. This reluctance can be explained by the
fact that, although delay can harm creditors, it is an integral part of the reorganization
process that serves the desired end of successful rehabilitation. Further, the automatic
stay on outside litigation imposed by ii U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. V 1981), see infra note
43, may at times actually work in certain creditors' favor by preventing diligent
creditors from obtaining quick and full payment of their claims to the detriment of
less vigilant creditors. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6296.
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tended to be used."' 24 The Bankruptcy Code, however, does
not lend itself easily to such an inquiry; 25 it embodies many
varied purposes - protecting jobs, 26 ensuring a fresh start for
debtors, 2 7 ensuring equitable treatment for creditors 28 - de29
signed to benefit debtors and creditors alike.
Manville can argue that filing a chapter i i petition at such
an early date is entirely consistent with the basic policy of the
Bankruptcy Code that encourages debtors to file petitions before their financial position deteriorates to the point at which
rehabilitation is no longer feasible, 30 even if that point would
be reached before actual insolvency. 3 1 Not only may creditors
file involuntary petitions when debtors have waited too long
without filing voluntary petitions, 32 but moreover both section
1112(b) of the Code and the case law warn debtors that a
petition will be dismissed when there is little or no likelihood
33
of successful rehabilitation.
Nonetheless, the absence of a requirement of insolvency as
a prerequisite for filing a chapter ii petition should not be
interpreted to mean that financial condition is not a relevant
consideration when evaluating the good faith of such a petition. Moving along a continuum from balance sheet and equitable insolvency 34 toward perfect financial health, one eventu24 In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., x8 Bankr. 164, 166-67 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982);
see Gaffney, supra note 14, at 224-26.
25 See Gaffney, supra note 14, at 225.

26 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 35,446 (1977) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
27 See S. REP. No. iio6, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1077); 123 CONG. REC. 35,452
(i977) (statement of Rep. Drinan).

28 See In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., i8 Bankr. 164, 168 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982);
sources cited supra note 27.
29 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5965-67; sources cited supra note 27.
30 Cf. 123 CONG. REc. 35,446 (1977) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (Code strongly
prefers reorganization over liquidation).
31 See ii

U.S.C. § io9 (Supp. V 1981); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

1

09.02 (L.

King 15th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. In contrast, both reorganization
sections of the old Bankruptcy Act, chapters X and XI, required the debtor to be
insolvent in either the bankruptcy sense or the equity sense. i1 U.S.C. §§ 530, 723
(1976) (amended 1978); see infra note 34.
32 Under § 126 of the old Act, involuntary petitions were authorized in chapter X
cases, ii U.S.C. § 526 (1976) (amended 1978), but not in chapter XI cases, see
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 321, ii U.S.C. § 721 (1976) (amended 1978). Section 303
of the Bankruptcy Code, 'i U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. V 198I), expands the use of involuntary petitions by authorizing them in all reorganization cases.
33 See ii

U.S.C. § 1112(b)(i), (2), (7) (Supp. V 1981); supra note 16; cases cited

supra note 17.
34 There are two distinct types of insolvency: balance sheet insolvency (liabilities
exceed assets) and equitable insolvency (inability to pay debts as they come due). The
Bankruptcy Code defines "insolvency" in balance sheet terms for general purposes,
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ally reaches a point of relative financial soundness at which
application of the bankruptcy laws could not have been contemplated by Congress. Unfortunately, Congress has never
identified the point at which the invocation of the bankruptcy
power ceases to be legitimate. 35 Such line-drawing was left to
the courts, to be accomplished by applying equitable principles
and the policies of the Code to individual cases. In general,
the inquiry should focus on whether the debtor is more likely
than not to reach either balance sheet or equitable insolvency
36
in the foreseeable future.
In the Manville case, the court's inquiry should involve a
careful scrutiny of the company's present financial condition,
projected earnings, and projected asbestos-related liability.
The asbestos claimants should be given an opportunity to
challenge the findings of the medical study of projected asbestosis occurrence that Manville commissioned 37 as well as Manville's assessment of its financial condition. 38 If the creditors
U.S.C § 101(26) (Supp. V 198i), whereas it adopts the equity test for the filing of
involuntary petitions, id. § 3 o3 (h)(i); see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 16, at 25, 34,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5811, 5820; H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 3, at 312, 323, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
Il

6269,

6280.

35 Section io9 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs ability to file for bankruptcy
relief, imposes no requirements with respect to financial condition. ii U.S.C. § 1O9
(Supp. V 1981).
36 The bankruptcy court should proceed with such an inquiry into the financial
health of the debtor only when creditors request it to do so. See id. § i1i2(b); 124
CONG. REc. 33,990 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); supra note 16.
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules indicate where the burden
of persuasion lies in a § I112(b) dismissal hearing. One could argue that, when the
financial condition of a company is in question, the burden of proof should lie with
that company because it controls all of the necessary information. In the absence of
direction from the Code, however, the most reasonable solution may be to place the
burden of persuasion on the moving party. The fact that a debtor such as Manville
meets all of the criteria set out explicitly in the Bankruptcy Code to govern who may
be a chapter ii debtor, see II U.S.C. § 1o9 (Supp. V 1981), should perhaps create a
rebuttable presumption that the debtor belongs in bankruptcy court. But see Transcript of ABC News Nightline, Dec. 27, 1982, at 4 (statement of Judge Dean Gandy,
president of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, suggesting that Manville
should bear burden of proving future insolvency "by a clear preponderance of the
evidence") (on file in Harvard Law School Library).
37 See A. Walker, supra note 7.
33 There are some doubts concerning the accuracy of Manville's projections of
liability and predictions of financial collapse. Not only do plaintiffs dispute Manville's
projections of the future incidence of asbestos-related disease, but they also dispute
Manville's projections of the amount of assets available to compensate victims. For
instance, although Manville hopes to win $6oo million or more from its insurance
companies in pending litigation, see Manville Plans to Seek Strict Limit on its
Liability for Asbestos Claims, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 29, col. 4, it has not
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succeed in showing that Manville is more likely than not to
remain solvent for the foreseeable future, the reorganization
petition should be dismissed as an attempted misuse of the
bankruptcy power. If, however, the creditors are unable to
show that Manville's projections of future financial ruin are
inaccurate, immediate filing would appear necessary to further
two basic policies of the Bankruptcy Code - the protection
of future claimants and the protection of jobs. Dismissal of
Manville's chapter ii petition and a return to the status quo
would deplete the company's assets and thus prejudice future
39
asbestos claimants unable to execute their judgments fully.
Further, to meet its future liabilities, Manville might be forced
to liquidate in full or in part and thereby to eliminate a large
number of jobs.
II.

LEAVING THE ESTIMATION OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS TO
STATE COURTS AND OTHER FEDERAL COURTS

If the Manville bankruptcy court determines that the reorganization should proceed, its major task will be disposing
of the overwhelming number of tort claims within its jurisdiction. The liquidation of contingent claims is governed by the
40
estimation provision of the Bankruptcy Code, section 502(c).
The term "estimation" is misleading insofar as it suggests a
mere guess or a lack of procedure; estimation in bankruptcy
can be a full adjudication. 4 1 Normally, the process of estimating individual claims is carried out before the bankruptcy
judge. 42 The unusual nature of the Manville case, however,
may permit the bankruptcy court to read section 502(c) in a
way that would allow it to lift the automatic stay on outside
litigation 43 and leave the estimation of individual asbestos
included that figure in its projections of its future financial condition. See Application
for Dismissal of Cases or Abstention, supra note 22, at 14-15.
39 See Bulow, Jackson & Mnookin, Winners and Losers in the Manville Bankruptcy, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1982, at 30, col. 3.
40 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (Supp. V 1981).
41 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 31,
502.03.

The legislative history of § 502(c)
indicates that the term "estimation" is synonymous with "liquidation." See S. REP.
No. 989, supra note i6, at 65, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5851; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 354, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 6310.
42 See, e.g., In re Unit Parts Co., 9 Bankr. 386, 390 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. ig8i);
3 COLLIER, supra note 31, l 502.03.
43 To allow litigation to proceed in other federal and state courts, the bankruptcy
court would have to lift the automatic stay on litigation involving the debtor that
went into effect as soon as the chapter ii petition was filed. See ii U.S.C. § 362
(Supp. V i98i). The court has the power to lift the stay "for cause." Id. § 362(d).
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claims -to other courts, as long as the bankruptcy court estimated Manville's total asbestos-related liability, 44 placed a
45
limit on that liability, and established a compensation fund
for recovery by present and future asbestos claimants.
Under this reading, the bankruptcy court 46 would estimate
Manville's total liability by statistical means. It could employ
epidemiological studies to determine the future incidence of
asbestos-related disease, and then study the data from the 3500
claims against Manville that have already reached judgment
or settlement 4 7 to determine the average cost of each claim. 4 8
The estimation of Manville's aggregate liability, a process entirely distinct from the estimation of individual claims, would
not directly determine the recovery rights of any individual.

Lifting the stay in order to implement this Note's proposal would not violate the stay's
purpose, which is to give the debtor a breathing spell from the financial pressures
that drove it into reorganization. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note I6, at 54-55,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5840-41. The pressure exerted
by the asbestos claims would be dispelled by the bankruptcy court's creation of an
asbestos compensation fund with a fixed ceiling. The adjudication of individual claims
in other courts would pose no additional financial risk to Manville as long as the
order granting relief from the stay specified that the plaintiffs would be limited to
executing their judgments from the fixed fund.
44 Included in the aggregate estimate would be Manville's projected legal costs to
defend the suits. In the 3500 suits that Manville disposed of before its chapter ii
filing, its total defense costs were nearly equal to the total cost of the judgments
rendered against it. See Affidavit Under Local Rule XI-2 of James F. Beasley, supra
note 7, at 5-6.
4S The size of the fund would necessarily be fixed to assure Manville of an upper
limit on its liability. The absence of such a ceiling would render the bankruptcy
proceeding pointless: it would deny the debtor the "fresh start" so vital to reorganizations, see sources cited supra note 27, and would violate the "feasibility" requirement.
of xx U.S.C. § II29(a)(Ii) (Supp. V i981) by reexposing the debtor to the massive
liability that drove it into bankruptcy in the first place.
46 The aggregate estimate would actually be made initially by the proponent of
the reorganization plan, presumably Manville itself. In the process of confirming the
plan, the court would either accept the estimate or require Manville to alter it. In
addition, any class of creditors impaired under the plan could object to the estimate
and block the plan by refusing to accept it. See iI U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (8) (Supp. V
i981). The asbestos claimants would probably be included within the class of unsecured creditors, unless the court were to find that the claims or interests of the asbestos
claimants are not "substantially similar," id. § I122(a), to those of the other unsecured
creditors. If the only objecting class is the unsecured creditors, the plan could be
forced through, with the court's assent, by means of the "cram down" provisions of
id. § 1129(b).
47 See Affidavit Under Local Rule XI-2 of James F. Beasley, supra note 7.
43 Manville filed a motion on February 3, 1983, requesting the bankruptcy judge
to make such an aggregate estimate. See Class Action Complaint for Estimation of
Contingent Unliquidated Asbestos-Related Health Claims, In re Johns-Manville
Corp., Nos. 82 B 11,656 to 82 B 11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug 26, 1982).
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A compensation fund could then be created from Manville's
future available assets and revenues. 4 9 By comparing the size
of the fund to Manville's total estimated tort liability, the court
could determine the percentage of each asbestos judgment that
could be paid from the fund.5 0 Plaintiffs winning judgments
in other courts would execute their judgments in the bankruptcy court, from which they would receive payment on a
pro rata basis 5 l to ensure that funds be conserved to compen49 Manville's epidemiology report estimated that asbestos-related disease would
continue to manifest itself over the next 26 years. See A. Walker, supra note 7, at
25. As in standard reorganization cases, the bankruptcy court would be able to draw
on Manville's assets for a few years beyond the filing of the final claim.
5o Because a reorganization plan may not discriminate among the members of a
single class absent express statutory authorization, all unsecured creditors must be
treated equally. See ii U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (Supp. V 198i). Therefore, if the asbestos
claimants, assuming that they are deemed unsecured creditors, see supra note 46,
were limited to recovering an amount less than the full value of their claims, the
other unsecured creditors would probably be subject to the same limit.
It is unlikely that the asbestos claimants could achieve priority over the other
unsecured creditors. The court's exercise of its equitable power to alter the normal
scheme of priorities by subordinating one class of claims to another is generally limited
to cases in which the holder of the claim being subordinated "is guilty of inequitable
conduct, or the claim itself is of a status susceptible to subordination, such as a
penalty or a claim for damages arising from the purchase or sale of a security of the
debtor." 124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (i978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG.
REC. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see In re Westgate-California Corp.,
642 F.2d 1174, 1178 (9 th Cir. i98i); In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th
Cir. 1977).

51 The percentage of each judgment that the bankruptcy court would pay out of
the fund would be calculated in a manner similar to that used in the following
example. Assume that Manville's total estimated liability is $2 billion. Half of that
liability, $i billion, is legal defense costs, and the other half is money damages for
plaintiffs. See supra note 44. Assume further that the bankruptcy court determines
that it can create a fund equivalent to 75% of Manville's total estimated liability, or
$i.5 billion. Assuming that the legal costs are fixed, only $.5 billion would be
available as money damages to plaintiffs, who would then each be paid one-half of
their judgments out of the compensation fund.
Of course, this example does not convey all of the complexities of the process;
other factors would necessarily enter into the determination of the percentage of each
claim that would be paid out of the fund. For instance, the bankruptcy court may
expect Manville to be found negligent in an increasing percentage of its cases as time
goes on because of its greater knowledge of the dangers of asbestos when the later
plaintiffs were exposed. The court may also choose to err on the low side in the
percentage of each judgment that it pays, in order to avoid depleting the fund before
all plaintiffs receive some reimbursement. Finally, the court may believe that litigation
costs will be altered by increased pressures to settle. See infra note 82.
The size of the fund available to asbestos claimants depends on the amount of
money allocated by the plan to other unsecured creditors and stockholders. The other
unsecured creditors will probably be treated equally with the asbestos claimants. See
supra note 5o. Stockholders, however, have a lower priority than that of unsecured
creditors. See, e.g., Julis, Classifying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 223 (I98I). The creditors could completely block reim-
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sate all future claimants proportionally. 52 If after several years
the court discovered that its estimate of Manville's aggregate
liability had been inaccurate, it could readjust the percentage
of each claim to be paid out of the fund. 53
A. The Estimation Requirement of Section 502(c)
The proposal outlined above would be impossible to implement if the Manville court had no choice under the Bankbursement of stockholders by means of the confirmation and "cram down" provisions
of IxIU.S.C. § 1129 (Supp. V 1981). See generally Klee, All You Ever Wanted To
Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133
(1979) (describing operation of "cram down").
52 Both present and future asbestos plaintiffs should be considered creditors and
should be treated alike in all respects. "Creditor" is defined in pertinent part by
§ oi(9) of the Bankruptcy Code as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." ii
U.S.C. § io(9) (Supp. V i98i). The future asbestos plaintiffs' status as creditors
thus turns on whether their rights to payment can be considered to have "arisen"
before the chapter xi petition was filed. Each right to payment arguably arose at the
time of exposure, before the chapter ii filing, even though statutes of limitations do
not generally begin to run until the time of manifestation of the disease. Cf. Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. I981) (holding that
insurance policies covering workers' exposure to asbestos are triggered at time of
exposure as well as time of manifestation), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
The cases also indicate that the holders of contingent claims have long been
considered creditors for bankruptcy purposes. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
the holders of some contingent claims were considered creditors even before those
claims were expressly made provable by the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat.
840 (codified in scattered sections of ii U.S.C. (1976); repealed 1978); see Maynard
v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273 (1931); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236
U.S. 549, 556-57 (1915). Under the Bankruptcy Code, contingent claims remain
provable; ii U.S.C. § ioi(4) (Supp. V 1981) includes all contingent claims as "claims"
to be dealt with by the bankruptcy courts.
Even if the Manville court were to hold that the future plaintiffs do not fail within
the definition of "creditors," the court would be forced to accommodate them in the
reorganization plan. Section 129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that any plan
that the bankruptcy court confirms be "feasible." iIU.S.C. § 1129(a) (Supp. V 1981).
Any plan that failed to accommodate future claimants would not be feasible, for it
would leave Manville unprotected from an estimated 30,000 post-reorganization lawsuits, see supra note 7, a situation that would lead inevitably to another financial
crisis and force Manville into bankruptcy court a second time. Further, equitable
considerations would render such a plan unacceptable. After asserting that the future
claimants are its justification for invoking the bankruptcy power, Manville cannot in
good faith use that power to exclude those claimants from recovery.
53Some would argue that such a system would be unfair, because an adjustment
in the percentage of each claim that would be paid from the fund would result in
unequal treatment of the claimants; later claimants would receive proportionally more
or less compensation than would earlier claimants. This sort of inequality, however,
is far more desirable than the alternative, which is to ignore the future claimants and
take the risk that, within the fixed fund, there will be no assets at all to compensate
them.
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ruptcy Code but to estimate each creditor's claim individually.54 Although section 502(c) and the accompanying
legislative history seem to suggest that a bankruptcy court
must make individual estimates,5 5 they do not foreclose a reading that the Manville court need not estimate each claim individually as long as it estimates and places a limit on the
aggregate of the creditors' claims. Such a reading would satisfy section 502(c) on its face, 56 because an estimation that
embodies every single asbestos claim against Manville would
occur.
The historical background and policy of section 502(c) support a reading that would permit the bankruptcy court to
54 Manville would clearly prefer to have the bankruptcy court use a panel of
experts to estimate individual claims. See Statement of G. Earl Parker, Manville
Senior Vice-President, in MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Transcript No. 18o6, at 4 (Aug.
30, 1982) (on file in Harvard Law School Library). First, Manville would be spared
the seven-figure verdicts of "irrational" juries carried away by pity for injured plaintiffs
and animosity toward corporate giants. See The Legal Issues in Manville's Move,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. i. Experts would be likely to make low
estimates because of the sheer volume of the claims coupled with the realization that
they were dealing with a single company with limited assets. Id. A panel of experts
might also be less likely to assess punitive damages against Manville than a jury
would be. In 1981 and the first half of x982, Manville was assessed punitive damages
in IO separate cases averaging $616,ooo per case. See Affidavit Under Local Rule
XI-2 of James F. Beasley, supra note 7, at 6 (listing figures and expressing Manville's
concern over punitive damage awards).
55 Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "there shall be estimated for
purpose of allowance under this section - (I) any contingent or unliquidated claim,
fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the closing of
the case." ii U.S.C. § 502(c) (Supp. V 1982) (emphasis added). The legislative history
of § 502(c) provides in pertinent part: "This subsection requires that all claims against
the debtor be converted into dollar amounts." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 16, at
65, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5851; H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 3, at 354, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6310.
(After these reports were written, § 502(c) was restricted somewhat with respect to
equitable claims, but the change is not relevant to claims for money damages.)
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress foresaw the predicament
in which Manville placed the bankruptcy court. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note
16, at 65, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5851; H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 3, at 354, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6310;
124 CONG. REC. 33,992, 33,996 (1978) (statements of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG.
REC. 32,393, 32,397 (1978) (statements of Rep. Edwards). It is also noteworthy that
the proposed Bankruptcy Rules contain no provision for the method of estimating
claims. The drafters of the Rules, like Congress, seem to have failed to anticipate
the Manville-type situation.
56 See supra note 55. The terms "any" in § 502(c) and "all" in the legislative
history, see id., arguably are ambiguous, definitely more so than other terms that
could have been used, such as "each claim." See also 3 COLLIER, supra note 31,
502.03, at 502-66 (indicating that § 502(c) may accommodate "the potentiality of
having another forum continue the process of liquidation if suit had been pending
there").
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estimate only the aggregate of claims. The old Bankruptcy
Act permitted courts to decline to allow claims "not capable
of liquidation or of reasonable estimation" or whose liquidation
or estimation "would unduly delay the administration of the
estate or any proceeding under this Act."' 5 7 The new requirement that the court estimate all claims is one of many reforms
in the Bankruptcy Code that are intended to implement the
Code's broad policy of affording the debtor the most complete
relief and the freshest start feasible by disposing of all possible
claims during the bankruptcy proceeding. 58 Congress wished
to eliminate the possibility that after the completion of reorganization the debtor would still be faced with the uncertainty
of contingent debts that could ruin the financial stability
achieved in the reorganization proceedings. 5 9 Congress' goals
would be achieved equally well by assigning a dollar value to
the whole of the asbestos plaintiffs' claims as by assigning a
dollar value to each individual claim. In either case, Manville
would exit from the reorganization certain of all of its liabilities
and able to carry on its business without the fear that pending
or future asbestos-related claims would endanger its financial
condition.
B. Class Actions
In deciding whether the Manville court, in applying section
502(c), should estimate each individual claim or should esti-

mate only the aggregate of the creditors' claims and leave the
estimation of individual claims to other courts, one must first
consider how the estimation of individual claims would be
managed in the bankruptcy court. If the bankruptcy court
were unable by means of class proceedings to eliminate the
need for individual adjudications and were thus forced to
conduct many thousands of individual proceedings, a strong
case could be made that it should leave such determinations
to be spread among a number of other courts.
Because the Bankruptcy Rules incorporate rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 a bankruptcy court is unable to certify a class unless it meets the criteria of both rule
57 1i U.S.C. § 93(d) (1976) (repealed 1978). Claims disallowed under § 57d were
deemed unprovable and were exempted from discharge; they could be litigated at a
later date and would be unaffected by the bankruptcy proceedings. See 3 COLLIER,
supra note 31, 502.03.
53 Cf. ii U.S.C. § Ioi(4) (Supp. V i98i) (expanding the definition of "claim" in
order that more creditors may fall within the purview of the bankruptcy court).
59See sources cited supra note 27.
60 See BANKR. R. 723, i1 U.S.C. app. at 1349 (1976); BANKR. R. 7023 (Preliminary
Proposed Draft 1982).
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23(a) and one of the subsections of rule 23(b). Federal courts

have been extremely reluctant to certify classes under rule 23
in mass accident cases, 6 1 including the very type of asbestos
litigation involved in the Manville case. 62 Courts have been
especially hesitant to certify mass accident classes under rule
23(b)(i).

63

Rule 23 (b)(I)(A) has generally been restricted to

cases in which equitable, as opposed to legal, remedies are
sought.64

Rule 23(b)(I)(B), designed for situations in which

individual adjudications by some class members would impair
the interests of other class members, 6 5 has generally been lim66
ited to cases in which the impairment is strictly monetary.
In the Manville case, the problem of monetary impairment
resulting from the limited nature of the available funds would
be solved by the bankruptcy court even if no class action were
employed; the reorganization plan would provide for only a
partial payment of present claims in order to preserve funds
for future claimants.
In the few mass accident cases in which 23(b)(I) classes

have been certified for plaintiffs seeking money damages, the
injuries - resulting from a nightclub fire, 67 an airplane
crash, 68 and food poisoning on a steamship 69 - were all
caused by a single, sudden event. The Manville case differs
sharply from these cases in a manner that makes class treatment less practical and desirable: the causation issue in Man61 See, e.g., 3B J. MooRE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02[2.I8] (2d ed. 1982); Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule
23 (b)(I), 96 HARv. L. REV. 1143, 1151, 1153 (1983).

62 See Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
63 See, e.g., Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
5i U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983); Note, supra note 61, at 1153. Rule 23(b)(I)
provides that a class action may be maintained if the prerequisites of rule 23(a) are
met and, in addition, the following condition is satisfied:
(i) [T]he prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests ....
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(I).

64 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d IO83,
io86 (9 th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
65 See Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1i67, 1181 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); supra note 63.
66 See Note, supra note 6i, at 1155 n.5I (collecting cases).

67 Coburn v. 4 -R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
68 In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
69 Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 6i F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd
mere., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ville is far more complex, involving exposure at many different
70
locations and times and in a variety of circumstances.
Class certification under rule 23(b)(3) 71 is even more unlikely than certification under rule 23 (b)(i). 72 The primary
reason for courts' reluctance to certify classes under rule
2 3 (b)(3) is the weight that 23(b)(3)(A) places on plaintiffs' interest in "individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions." 73 When serious personal injuries or death
have been the subject of litigation, courts have found a strong
interest in individual control. 74 In addition, some courts have
hesitated to certify classes when the members' claims have
been a mix of wrongful death and personal injury claims, 75 as
is true in the Manville case. Finally, not all of the Manville
plaintiffs are yet known. Because rule 23 (b)(3 ) includes an
opt-out provision, 76 a resolution of the case cannot bind any
plaintiff who did not receive notice and an opportunity to opt
out. 77 This provision would exclude future plaintiffs from the
class and would result in a proliferation of classes by requiring
the court to certify new classes periodically as new injuries
manifested themselves.
The one case similar to Manville in which a class has been
certified under rule 23(b)(3), Payton v. Abbott Labs, 78 demonstrates the futility of employing class treatment in the Manville
case. In Payton, which involved women injured in various
70 Cf. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1982) (drawing same
distinction between cases cited supra notes 67-69 and Dalkon Shield litigation in the
process of denying 23(b)(I) class certification to Dalkon Shield plaintiffs), cert. denied,
51 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983).
71 Rule 23(b)( 3 ) provides for maintaining an action as a class action when the
prerequisites of rule 23(a) are met and the following conditions are satisfied:
[Tihe court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions ....
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
72Certification under rule 23(b)(2) is not even a possibility; rule 23(b)(2) is restricted
to cases in which plaintiffs seek primarily injunctive, as opposed to monetary, relief.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 95, 102
(1966).
73FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)(3 )(A).
74See, e.g., Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 852-53 ( 9 th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 5I U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 5o
F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
75See Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566, 569-72 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Daye v.
Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
76 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2).
77See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. i56 (1974).
7883 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
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ways over a span of many years by in utero exposure to the
drug DES, the plaintiff class was restricted to issues of
liability7 9 and was confined to Massachusetts residents. 80 In
Manville, issues such as causation and damages also vary with
each plaintiff: plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos in different
plants, at different times, and under different circumstances,
and their injuries vary in both type and severity. Furthermore,
various state negligence and strict product liability regimes
apply different standards of conduct and liability to defendants. Therefore, the bankruptcy court would be limited to
certifying separate subclasses for each distinct state law regime, and each subclass would in turn be limited to litigating
common issues of liability as were the plaintiffs in the Payton
case. The bankruptcy court would still face individual litigation of causation and damages issues. Not only would it be
undesirable for a bankruptcy judge with limited experience
managing class actions to tackle a class action of Manville's
magnitude and complexity, but moreover one may doubt
whether the court would be able to manage the enormous
number of individual causation and damage adjudications that
would lie outside the proper scope of class treatment. 8 1

C. Policy ConsiderationsMandating the Estimation of
Individual Claims by Courts Other than the
Bankruptcy Court
If common issues in the Manville case may be disposed of
in a class format, even if different classes must be certified for
several different states, such treatment would be preferable to
individual adjudication: it would save time, prevent inconsistent judgments, and better conserve the assets of the going
concern by reducing litigation costs. 8 2 Yet even if some issues
79 Certification of discrete issues within a case is permitted by FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4).
so83 F.R.D. at 386-87.
81See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee note ("In these circumstances [a

mass accident resulting in injuries to numerous persons] an action conducted nominally
as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried."),
reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 95, 103 (1966).
s2 Minimizing litigation costs is of particular concern in the Manville case, because
Manville's defense costs will be deducted from the already limited assets available to
the asbestos claimants. The calculations presented at supra note 5i demonstrate the
serious danger that litigation costs would consume most of the compensation fund
and leave little money for the plaintiffs. The ideal estimation procedure from the
standpoint of limiting Manville's defense costs would seem to be the estimation of
individual claims by a panel of experts in the bankruptcy court rather than individual
estimation in numerous other courts. In defense of the plan proposed in this Note,
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may be treated in a class action format, those issues would
more appropriately be litigated in courts other than the bankruptcy court. This conclusion is suggested by a consideration
of the policies underlying the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
and the right to trial by jury.
.z. Analogy to Pendent Jurisdiction.-

Northern Pipeline

problems aside, there is no question that the Manville bankruiptcy court has the power to exercise jurisdiction over the
asbestos-related claims before it.8 3 In bankruptcy proceedings,
the policy of providing the debtor complete relief by disposing
of all possible creditor claims pressures the court to exercise
jurisdiction to the greatest extent possible. Nevertheless, the
court's equitable powers free it to choose not to exercise jurisdiction over particular proceedings within a chapter ii case
when the court believes such abstention to be consonant with
the aims of the Bankruptcy Code and in the interests of justice. 84 The unique aspects of the Manville case invite the
however, it should be pointed out that, even though the use of experts would reduce
Manville's defense costs, such a procedure could actually increase the total litigation
costs in the asbestos suits by forcing plaintiffs into multiforum litigation. See infra
PP. 1138-39.

Moreover, the example presented at supra note 51 assumed that defense costs
would remain as high as they are currently. Under the plan proposed in this Note,
however, two factors would make both plaintiffs' attorneys and defense attorneys
more willing to settle out of court, and thus would contribute to reduced defense
costs. First, because plaintiffs would be limited to recovering less than ioo% of their
judgments, their lawyers' contingent fees would be reduced proportionately. This
reduction in contingent fees would in turn reduce the number of claims that plaintiffs'
lawyers would be willing to litigate fully, and would create added pressure on those
lawyers to settle out of court. Second, the defense litigation would almost certainly
be placed in the hands of a court-appointed master, because the establishment of a
fixed ceiling on Manville's liability would eliminate Manville's incentive to defend the
fund. Because he would not be motivated by such concerns as avoiding adverse
publicity for the company, the master would have no reason to adopt the allegedly
overaggressive litigation strategy that Manville has pursued for several years, see
Application for Dismissal of Cases or Abstention, supra note 22, at io-ii.
13 See 28 U.S.C. § I47i (Supp. V 198i); see also Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
642 (1947) (holding that jurisdiction of article III reorganization courts under chapter
X of Bankruptcy Act of 1898 extended even beyond creditors' claims to plenary suits
brought by trustee). Although 28 U.S.C. § 1471 will not take effect officially until
April 1, 1984, when the new bankruptcy court system will come into being, its terms
are expressly incorporated by the BRA provision governing bankruptcy jurisdiction
in the interim, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405, 92 Stat. 2549, 2685 (1978) (not codified).
s4 See Bohack Corp. v. Borden, Inc. (In re Bohack Corp.), 599 F.2d ix6o (2d
Cir. 1979); Jewel Terrace Corp. v. Kew Gardens Tenants League (In re Jewel Terrace
Corp.), 3 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 14 7i(d) (Supp. V 1981).
Because 28 U.S.C. § 147I(a) (Supp. V 198i) grants the bankruptcy courts exclusive
jurisdiction over title H cases, the bankruptcy court would not be permitted to abstain
from the entire Manville reorganization case. However, because the asbestos claims
are not reorganization cases in themselves but rather are "particular proceeding[s]"
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exercise of such discretion, because the bankruptcy court may
leave the determination of individual claims to other courts
without compromising the complete relief of the debtor.
Under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,8 5 even when a federal court has the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
state claims, it should decline to do so unless such exercise is
justified by "considerations of judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to litigants." ' 86 Because the bankruptcy court's
power to exercise jurisdiction over the asbestos claims derives
not from pendent jurisdiction but rather from the Bankruptcy
Code itself,8 7 the Manville court cannot mechanically apply
pendent jurisdiction doctrine to free itself from individual estimation of the claims. However, insofar as the Manville court
is a federal court with a choice whether to exercise jurisdiction
over state law claims in the absence of diversity of citizenship,
its situation is close enough to that of a federal court exercising
pendent jurisdiction that it might look to pendent jurisdiction
policies for guidance.
One can imagine situations in which a bankruptcy court's
estimation of many individual claims in a Manville-type case
might not hinder judicial economy. For instance, if Manville
were the sole defendant in the asbestos claims, the bankruptcy
court's exercise of jurisdiction over those claims would have
the effect of moving them into a different forum without increasing the amount of litigation. Similarly, if there were
numerous codefendants for each asbestos claim but all were
in bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court could consolidate
the litigation even if the various codefendants were in different
bankruptcy courts. 88
The facts of the Manville litigation do not fit these patterns.
Nearly every asbestos claim against Manville also involves a
number of codefendant asbestos manufacturers. 8 9 Because of
the multiplicity of defendants, most of the various state and
federal courts in which the pending claims have been filed will
"arising in or related to" the overall reorganization case, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (Supp.
V I98I), the bankruptcy court may abstain from hearing the claims "in the interest
of justice." Id.; see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 16, at 153-54, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5939-4o; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at
445-46, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6400-ol.
85383 U.S. 715 (1966).
86 Id. at 726.
87See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405, 92 Stat. 2549,

2685 (not codified) (governing bankruptcy jurisdiction until April i, 1984, when 28
U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. V 1981) officially takes effect).
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1475 (Supp. V 1981).

89See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 Bankr. 523 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (22
defendants).
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continue to hear cases against the other defendants even if
Manville's liability is determined by the bankruptcy court. 90
Therefore, if the bankruptcy court were to estimate claims
individually, a sort of mass mitosis would occur, splitting each
of the 16,500 claims into two components and requiring two
separate courts to consider each claim. The result would be
a multiplicity of suits and a massive waste of judicial resources. 9 1 Even if the Manville court were to treat the asbestos
claims as a class action rather than as individual actions, the
duplication of efforts by other state and federal courts would
be substantial.
Considerations of "fairness to litigants" 92 also weigh heavily against the estimation of individual claims by the bankruptcy court. The estimation of each individual claim would
place an intolerable burden on the plaintiffs, who would be
forced to pursue their suits simultaneously in two separate
forums, perhaps thousands of miles apart. Moreover, the
plaintiffs would be faced with the prospect of inconsistent
judgments on a single claim. Plaintiffs winning jury verdicts
against Manville's codefendants would understandably feel
cheated if a panel of experts in the bankruptcy court gave
them either no award against Manville or an award much
smaller than they could have expected from a jury.
Gibbs further emphasized that federal courts should be
particularly hesitant to exercise jurisdiction when "state issues
substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the
scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the
remedy sought."' 9 3 In the asbestos cases, state tort issues
clearly predominate. Admittedly, bankruptcy courts have experience in applying state law because they regularly allow
and estimate state law contract and tort claims. Nevertheless,
90 Once the automatic stay went into place and halted all litigation involving
Manville and UNR, the codefendants in the asbestos cases attempted to have the
litigation stayed for them also. As of December 1, 1982, at least 38 courts had ruled
that the automatic stay affects only Manville and UNR and that litigation must
proceed against the other codefendants. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23
Bankr. 523 (N.D. Cal. 1982); In re UNR Indus., 23 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1982). As of the same date, approximately 14 other courts had stayed proceedings
against all codefendants, see, e.g., Asbestos Cases, No. 78-98 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 1982),
although a number of those stays were only temporary, pending a full briefing and
argument on the issue, see, e.g., Bowman v. Johns-Manville Sales, No. C-2-8I-1492
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 1982).
91 Of course, the resolution that this Note suggests would not free the bankruptcy
court from all duties with respect to the disposition of individual claims. The bankruptcy court would be freed, however, from managing litigation that is wholly duplicative of litigation in progress in other courts.
92 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
93 Id.
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whenever a bankruptcy court applies state law, it must secondguess state courts and apply state law as it believes the highest
state court would. 94 Such determinations always involve the
possibility of error and thus should not be made more often
than is necessary. When state law questions determine the
rights of many thousands of litigants, considerations of comity
should cause a bankruptcy court to be doubly hesitant to
exercise its jurisdiction. 95
2. Right to Trial by Jury. Like the policies underlying
pendent jurisdiction, the right to trial by jury suggests that
the Manville bankruptcy court should leave the estimation of
individual claims to other courts. Typically, the asbestos
claims are brought under state product liability statutes and
negligence regimes that confer a right to trial by jury. 96 In
bankruptcy court, however, the claimants probably enjoy no
such right. The leading case under the old Bankruptcy Act,
Katchen v. Landy,9 7 recognized that litigants had no right to
a jury trial, because adjudication of their claims fell within
the "summary" jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as opposed
to the plenary jurisdiction of another federal or state court. 98
The asbestos plaintiffs' claims similarly fall within the "summary" jurisdiction category; they are claims brought against
assets of the estate that are currently under control of the
bankruptcy court. 9 9 Although it is disputed whether the draft94 See ii

U.S.C. § 502(b)(I) (Supp. V I98I).

95 See Jewel Terrace Corp. v. Kew Gardens Tenants League (In re Jewel Terrace
Corp.), 3 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 198o); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 16, at
154, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5940; H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 3, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6oI2.

It may be that most of the asbestos claims were originally filed in federal district
courts rather than state courts. Nevertheless, the competence and comity arguments
advanced in this Note still weigh in favor of the bankruptcy court's leaving the
estimation of individual claims to the federal district courts in which the claims were

filed. The federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois, for example, is
more experienced in construing Illinois tort law than is the bankruptcy court for the

Southern District of New York.
96 See, e.g., Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864
(198i) (action brought under Illinois strict products liability theory); Beshada v. JohnsManville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (action brought under New
Jersey strict products liability theory).
97 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
9s Id. at 336-37; see Belfance v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses (In re Portage

Assocs.), 16 Bankr. 445, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Levy, Trial by Jury Under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 12 CONN. L. REv. I, 3-5 & n.12 (1979). For
discussions of the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction, see J.
MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 212 (r956); 13 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3570 (1975); Levy,
supra, at 3 n.12.

99 See Booth v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In re Cafes Internationale,
Ltd.), 13 Bankr. 155, 158 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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ers of the Bankruptcy Reform Act intended to preserve, or
instead to eliminate, the summary-plenary distinction for purposes of determining the right to trial by a jury, 10 0 most courts
have continued to apply the distinction. 0 1
The effect of estimating individual claims in the bankruptcy court would thus be to deny plaintiffs the juries to
which they would be entitled in other courts. This denial
cannot be justified by the policy underlying the absence of a
jury right in the typical bankruptcy case - freeing the bank0 2
ruptcy court to carry out its mission quickly and efficiently.'
In the Manville case, the bankruptcy court would promote
neither efficiency nor any other policy of the Bankruptcy Code
by estimating individual claims itself.
ITI. CONCLUSION

The new Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy courts broad
discretion to dismiss reorganization petitions filed in bad faith.
When a solvent and healthy corporation files a reorganization
petition based on massive but speculative tort liability, the
court should inquire, on motion of a party in interest, into the
financial condition of the company and the validity of its
projections of liability. If creditors are able to show that the
debtor's projections are inaccurate and that the debtor corporation does not face insolvency in the foreseeable future, the
court should dismiss the petition under section iii2(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
If the creditors fail to discredit the corporation's projections
and it appears that the purposes of the Code would be served
by the filing, the bankruptcy court should entertain the petition. Nevertheless, the court should not undertake the estimation of each creditor's individual claim. Rather, to promote
judicial economy, comity, and fairness to the plaintiffs, and in
100 Compare Belfance v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses (In re Portage Assocs.), 16
Bankr. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (11 U.S.C. § 1480 (Supp. V *981) preserves the
jury right system of the Bankruptcy Act), with Pinson v. Reynolds (In re First Fin.
Group, Inc.), *i Bankr. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) (i, U.S.C. § 1480 (Supp. V 1981)
discards the summary-plenary distinction that determined jury rights under the Bankruptcy Act), and Brown v. Frank Meador Buick, Inc. (In re Frank Meador Buick,
Inc.), 8 Bankr. 450 (Bankr. W.D. Va. *gI)(same). For a general discussion of the
two competing interpretations of ii U.S.C. § 1480 (Supp. V 1981), see Levy, supra
note 98.
101 See, e.g., Belfance v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses (In re Portage Assocs.), I6
Bankr. 445, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Zimmerman v. Mozer (In re Mozer), xo
Bankr. 1002 (Bankr. D. Colo. i98*); G.S.F. Corp. v. Inleasing Corp. (In re G.S.F.
Corp.), 7 Bankr. 807 (Bankr. D. Mass. i98o).
102 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1966).
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order not to interfere with the plaintiffs' right to trial by jury
under state law, the bankruptcy court should limit itself to
estimating the corporation's total liability, placing a ceiling on
that liability, and establishing a compensation fund for the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue their
claims in the state and federal courts in which the claims were
originally filed and then to return to the bankruptcy court to
execute their judgments on a pro rata basis against the compensation fund.

